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UNITED ST A TES 
SUPREME COURT 
Badham v. Eu, 
_U.S.~ No. 87-1818 (Jan. 17, 1989). 
Supreme Court Upholds 
California Redistricting Plan 
In a one-sentence decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld a three-judge 
panel's decision that California legis-
lative and congressional districts do not 
violate the equal protection clause of 
the United States Constitution. 
In a six-to-three vote, the justices 
simply affirmed the lower court decision 
issued in April 1988 (see CRLR Vol. 8, 
No. 3 (Summer 1988) pp. 133-34), which 
held that California Republicans had 
not been deprived of political power 
and representation. The lower court 
noted, in part, that in light of the 
Republicans' presence in 18 of 45 House 
seats, one of two Senate seats, and the 
governorship, California Republicans 
were not wholly disenfranchised. 
The Supreme Court decision was 
somewhat surprising, given the proced-
ural posture. The Court had dismissed 
the appeal on October 3; but on Novem-
ber 14 had announced it might hear full 
argument. No explanation was given for 
the ruling or the decision not to proceed 
with full briefing and argument. 
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. 
County Comm 'n, 
_U.S.__, 89 D.A.R. 691, 
No. 87-1303 (Jan. 18, 1989). 
Property Tax Differentials 
Based on Time of 
Purchase Unconstitutional 
In a case expected to have potential 
repercussions in California, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that property tax 
assessments that base their valuation on 
time of purchase of the property violate 
the equal protection clause of the United 
States Constitution. 
The case arose in West Virginia, 
where a county tax assessor established 
her own policy of setting the property 
value assessment based on the price at 
the time of purchase of the parcel, and 
made only modest reevaluations there-
after. Because of inflating land values, 
the result was gross disparities in tax 
payments, as the more recently pur-
chased properties were appraised at far 
higher rates than those which still carried 
old valuations. This practice is col-
loquially known as the "welcome 
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stranger" method, since existing property 
owners can effectively put higher tax 
payments on newcomers. The plaintiff 
coal company annually paid the tax. 
annually challenged the assessment, and 
annually lost at the administrative level. 
A suit brought in state court was success-
ful on constitutional grounds, but was 
reversed by the West Virginia Supreme 
Court, which held that no taxpayer could 
be heard to complain that the method 
of assessing his/her taxes based on pur-
chase price was unfair; the only remedy, 
the court held, was to seek to raise the 
assessed value of the neighboring parcels. 
The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice 
Rehnquist writing for a unanimous court, 
held that the resulting differences in 
assessed value-amounting to 8 to 35 
times higher tax rates-violate the equal 
protection clause. The Court also held 
that it is inappropriate to remit the 
complainant to attempt to raise others' 
tax rates. Rather, the case was remanded 
for reduction of the taxpayer's payment 
to that equal to equivalent parcels. 
Because Proposition 13, which added 
Article XllIA to the California Constitu-
tion, contains a very similar assessment 
scheme, the impact on California is 
potentially enormous. Under Proposition 
13, all property in 1978 was rolled back 
to its assessed rate in 1975, with 2% 
increases permitted annually. However, 
all property is reassessed at full market 
value upon sale. Under the current 
market for residential property in Cali-
fornia, differentials in assessed rates of 
ten times are common. However, the 
Supreme Court in a footnote specifically 
noted that it was not deciding the valid-
ity of a statewide scheme such as Propo-
sition 13, but only a county system 
without state sanction. The validity of 
Proposition 13 is nearly certain to be 
tested within the year. 
CIRCUIT COURTS 
OF APPEALS 
Montero v. Meyer, 
_F.2d__, No. 88-2469 
(10th Cir., Nov. I, 1988); 
Delgado v. Smith, 
_F.2d__, No. 88-6068 
(I Ith Cir., Nov. 4, 1988). 
Voting Rights Act Does Not Require 
Initiative Petitions To Be Bilingual 
In a pair of cases, federal appellate 
courts recently held that the language 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. section 1973b(f), do not apply to 
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petitions being circulated for initiati,-es. 
Such petitions are not. in the courts" 
views, part of the "voting" or "electoral" 
process. as are ballots and other ma-
terials distributed at election time. The 
cases were particularly noteworthy. be-
cause both courts disagreed with U.S. 
Department of Justice guidelines in-
terpreting the Act, and because in both 
cases the circulated petitions were to 
place on the ballot initiative measures to 
declare English the "official language" 
of the states of Colorado and Florida. 
CALIFORNIA 
SUPREME COURT 
Center for Public Interest Law, 
et al. v. Fair Political 
Practices Commission, et al., 
No. S007758 (Dec. 15. 1988). 
Challenge to FPPC's 
Proposition 73 Rulini 
Ordered Reinstated 
The California Supreme Court re-
cently granted the Center for Public Inter-
est Law's (CPIL) petition for review of 
the Fourth District Court of Appeal's 
denial of its petition for writ of mandate 
challenging the Fair Political Practices 
Commission's (FPPC) interpretation of 
Propositions 68 and 73, two campaign 
finance reform initiatives approved by 
the voters in June 1988. 
The case involves CPI L's challenge 
to the FPPC's ruling that virtually none 
of Proposition 68 survives the simultane-
ous passage of Proposition 73. When 
two initiatives on the same subject mat-
ter pass simultaneously, both must be 
implemented. In areas where there is 
"irreconcilable conflict" between the pro-
visions of the two initiatives, the one 
which received the most votes-here, 
Proposition 73-prevails. 
Among other things, Proposition 7J 
prohibits the use of "public monies" to 
fund political campaigns. Proposition 68 
creates a "Campaign Reform Fund" 
which is fed by voluntary taxpayer-desig-
nated contributions on state income tax 
forms. CPIL contends that Proposition 
68's Campaign Reform Fund is not the 
use of "public monies" as defined and 
prohibited by Proposition 73; further, 
the voluntary $3 contribution is a tax 
credit, which is not considered "public 
monies." The FPPC ruled that Propo-
sition 73's use of "public monies" for 
campaigns "irreconcilably conflicts" with 
the Campaign Reform Fund provisions 
in Proposition 68. The Center challenged 
that ruling before the Fourth District, 
Ill 
I• 
which agreed with the FPPC's interpre-
tation and dismissed CPIL's case. 
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The December 15 Supreme Court 
ruling, however, ordered the Fourth Dis-
trict to reopen the case and issue an 
alternative writ, thus requiring the FPPC 
to show cause why the Center's petition 
should not be granted. Briefing conclud-
ed on January 31; oral argument will 
take place during the spring. 
Henning v. Industrial 
Welfare Commission, 
_Cal. 3d_, 88 C.D.O.S. 7600, 
No. C004101 (O1.:t. 31, 1988). 
Two-Tiered Minimum Wage 
For Tipped Employees Unlawful 
The California Supreme Court held 
that a two-tiered minimum wage under 
which employees who customarily re-
ceive tips are afforded a lower minimum 
wage violates California law. 
Effective July I, I 988, the California 
Industrial Welfare Commission's Order 
No. MW-88 raised the minimum wage 
in California from $3.35 to $4.25 per 
hour, but also established an alternative 
minimum wage of $3.50 per hour for 
those who customarily receive tips in 
excess of $60 per month. 
Petitioners, the AFL-CIO and its 
officials and members, filed for a writ of 
mandate in the court of appeal. Two 
hotel and motel and restaurant associa-
tions intervened in defense. The court of 
appeal granted the writ, holding that 
Labor Code section 351, on its terms, as 
previously interpreted by the Commis-
sion, and in decisional law of the state 
Supreme Court, bars any but a uniform 
minimum wage. 
The Supreme Court, acting on an 
expedited hearing schedule, affirmed, per 
Justice Mosk, joined by Chief Justice 
Lucas and Justices Panelli, Eagleson, 
and Kaufman. The Court set out at 
length the history of tips in California 
law under which, essentially, tips have 
moved from being absolutely barred, to 
being a credit against the employer's 
obligation to pay wages, to being an 
item for which the Commission could 
permit an offset against minimum wage 
payments, to being the exclusive proper-
ty of the employee, with no authority 
for the employer or Commission to con-
trol or offset against wages. The Court 
took particular pains to note that the 
Commission had in an earlier case before 
the Court taken the explicit position 
that section 351 prohibits taking tips 
into account in setting or paying mini-
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mum wages, and the Court had adopted 
that position. Industrial Welfare 
Comm n v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 
690 (1980). In light of this history, the 
Court was unwilling to accord the usual 
deference to administrative interpreta-
tion of its jurisdictional statute. 
Justice Broussard, joined by Justice 
Arguelles, concurred specially to score 
the Commission for abandoning its ear-
lier position. In light of the judicial 
imprimatur definitively interpreting the 
statute, it was no longer a matter for 
debate and it was inappropriate for the 
Commission to presume it could simply 
change its mind. Justice Broussard wrote 
to underscore that the deference owed 
administrative agencies in interpreting 
statutes should not be overstated and is 
not binding. 
Committee To Defend Reproductive 
Rights v. Kizer, 
No. S007691 (Dec. 15, 1988). 
Supreme Court Declines 
Medi-Cal Abortion Case 
For the second time since the change 
in the Supreme Court following the 1986 
election that resulted in three Deuk-
mejian appointees replacing three Brown 
appointees, the Court has refused to 
revisit the issue of whether the state 
must provide Medi-Cal funding for abor-
tions for the poor. 
In what has become an annual ritual, 
the legislature passed an explicitly un-
constitutional limitation in the Budget 
Act, prohibiting payment of any Medi-
Cal funds for abortions for the indigent. 
This practice was struck down in Com-
mittee to Defend Reproductive Rights 
v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252 (1981), where 
the Court held that so long as abortion 
is a legitimate procedure and constitu-
tional right, and the state provides 
medical care payments for other proced-
ures, it may not invade a woman's state 
constitutional right to privacy to deter-
mine for her what medical decision she 
may make. Since then the legislature 
annually includes the limitation, the 
Committee annually files suit and wins, 
and the limitation is eliminated. 
This year's case was slightly different, 
in that the Attorney General refused to 
defend the state, calling it a waste of 
effort and state funds. Department of 
Health Services attorneys took up the 
cudgel and lost. As with last year, only 
Chief Justice Lucas and Justice Panelli 
voted to hear the matter. Under Supreme 
Court rules, four votes are needed to 
grant review. 
Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation, 
_Cal. 3d-, 
88 D.A.R. 16079 (Dec. 29, 1988). 
Wrongful Termination Case 
May Not Include Tort Damages 
In a long-awaited decision, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court upheld a cause of 
action by fired employees for wrongful 
termination, but strictly limited the avail-
able damages to contract damages, and 
excluded all tort remedies, including 
punitive damages. 
The Court reviewed what was other-
wise a garden-variety wrongful termina-
tion suit, which alleged the three basic 
causes of action for wrongful termina-
tion: (I) a tort cause of action for ter-
mination in violation of public policy; 
(2) a contract action for breach of an 
implied covenant to fire only for cause; 
and (3) a tortious act of firing in viola-
tion of the general obligation of good 
faith and fair dealing which is read into 
all contracts. The trial court sustained a 
demurrer without leave to amend, which 
was upheld by the court of appeal. 
On review the Supreme Court, per 
Chief Justice Lucas joined by Justices 
Panelli, Arguelles, and Eagleson, affirm-
ed and reversed. On the public policy 
theory, the Court held that the public 
policy-whether embodied in Constitu-
tion, statute, or other policy-must be 
one that affects the public at large. 
Since the plaintiffs alleged "policy" was 
one affecting only the employer, no cause 
of action was stated. 
On the contract issue, the Court re-
versed, holding that the statute of frauds-
which prohibits the enforcement of an 
oral contract whose term extends beyond 
one year-does not apply to open-ended 
employment contracts. The Court noted 
that the lower court decision was in 
conformity with an earlier decision of 
the same court, but which was in irrecon-
cilable conflict with an earlier Supreme 
Court decision. The Court also held that 
the contract alleged could be oral, and 
its implied term of firing only for cause 
could similarly be oral, both of which 
could overcome the presumption in 
Labor Code section 2922 that contracts 
for employment without a definitive 
term are terminable at will. 
The Court then turned to the most 
momentous issue in the case-the nature 
of the remedies available for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing in employment contracts. 
Following a lengthy canvassing of past 
and present authority, the Court held 
that only contract damages for lost 
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wages are available; and that no tort 
damages, including general damages for 
pain and suffering and punitive damages, 
are available. 
Justices Broussard, Kaufman, and 
Mosk each filed separate opinions dis-
senting from the third holding. 
The case has been closely watched 
by attorneys and employers throughout 
the state, as it was originally accepted 
for review by the Bird Court, but then 
became a Lucas Court matter when it 
was not decided prior to the Brown 
appointees' departure on January 1, 
1987. The plaintiffs' bar universally criti-
cized the decision as rendering most 
wrongful termination cases unattractive 
for filing, because of _the severe limita-
tion on available damages. 
State of California v. Texaco, 
_Cal.3d._, 
209 C.D.O.S. 7431 (Oct. 20, 1988). 
California Antitrust Law 
Cannot Bar Texaco-Getty Merger 
The California Supreme Court held 
that state antitrust law, as embodied in 
the Cartwright Act, Business and Pro-
fessions Code section 16720, does not 
apply to the merger of Texaco and the 
California operations of the Getty Oil 
Company. 
The Attorney General of California 
brought suit to enjoin the widely publi-
cized merger of Texaco and Getty. as it 
affects Texaco's takeover of Getty's Cali-
fornia operations. The merger created 
the second-largest oil company in the 
United States. Pursuant to federal anti-
trust law, it was reviewed by the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC 
issued a complaint under Title 7 of the 
Clavton Act, 15 U.S.C. section 18. based 
in part on complaints from the Califor-
nia Attorney General. The FTC eventual-
Iv entered into a consent order with 
Texaco. permitting the merger subject 
to some limitations and conditions, a 
few of which affects California. The 
California Attorney General was dis-
satisfied, and filed suit in state court 
based largely on the Clayton Act com-
plaint, alleging anticompetitive effects in 
California. 
The Court, per Chief Justice Lucas, 
joined by Justices Panelli. Arguelles. and 
Eagleson, held that neither the Cart-
wright Act nor the Unfair Business Prac-
tice; Act, Business and Professions Code 
section 17200. are intended to or do 
apply to the mere fact of a merger. but 
only to ongoing conduct. 
Justice Mosk. in a lengthy dissent 
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joined by Justices Kaufman and Brous-
sard would have held that a cause of 
acti~n could be stated under the Cart-
wright Act against the merger as it affect-
ed California. 
CALIFORNIA 
COURTS OF APPEAL 
Murat v. Centennial Ins. Co., 
_Cal. App. 3d_, 88 D.A.R. 16073, 
No. 8033361 (2d Dist., Dec. 23, 1988). 
Insurer Can Override Choice 
of Counsel Used By Insured 
The Second District Court of Appeal 
has upheld a new statute permitting an 
insurance company which is required to 
provide independent counsel to oversee 
the choice of counsel and require an 
attorney with minimum experience and 
malpractice insurance. 
As part of a package of tort reforms 
passed in 1987, section 2860 was added 
to the Civil Code. The statute at issue 
permits an insurer to place limits on the 
counsel its insured may retain when in-
dependent counsel is required under San 
Diego Federal Credit Union v. Cumis 
Insurance Society, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 
3d 358 (1984). Attorneys retained to 
represent the insured to avoid any con-
flict between the insured and insurance 
company are known as "Cumis counsel" 
and are paid by the insurance company. 
The new statute permits a company to 
require that Cumis counsel have at least 
five years' experience both in tort and in 
the particular area being litigated, and 
have errors and omissions insurance. 
Following a dispute between the in-
sured and the homeowners' insurance 
company over which attorneys the in-
sured wanted to represent her in a "toxic 
tort" case, declaratory relief actions were 
cross-filed in June 1987. The new statute 
was passed on the last day of the legis-
lative session in September 1987. and 
took effect on January I, I 988. The trial 
court granted the company's requested 
relief. 
The Court of Appeal. per Justices 
Croskey, Klein, and Danielson, affirmed. 
The court dismissed arguments grounded 
in due process and equal protection, 
and held that the statute is procedural 
in nature and hence may be applied to 
pending as well as future cases. 
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